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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report systematically compares over 2,000 South African and non-South African 
informal sector entrepreneurs and assesses the similarities and differences between them 
in terms of their business operations and their business risks. The two comparison groups 
are (i) refugees (holders of Section 24 permits) in Cape Town and Limpopo and (ii) South 
African migrants operating businesses in the same localities. 
The general literature on informal entrepreneurship conventionally divides participants 
into survival (or necessity) entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs. The former are 
driven to participate by the need to survive and because they have no other choice. The 
latter choose to work in the informal sector because they see opportunities for economic 
advancement,  they prefer to work for themselves rather than for others, or they feel that 
they have the right aptitude. In the South African context, studies of entrepreneurial moti-
vation in the informal sector have sought to go beyond the idea of survivalism and dem-
onstrate that many participants in the informal economy are not driven by desperation 
but are highly motivated entrepreneurs. This survey used an entrepreneurial motivation 
scale to assess differences, if any, between South Africans and refugees. The ranking of 
reasons for starting a business does not differ significantly within each group but there are 
important differences between them. Economic survival motivations scored most highly 
for both groups, and providing employment or a service to others was the least important. 
The highest single factor for both groups was the need to earn more money for basic needs. 
Also very important for both was the desire to provide family with greater financial security 
and the desire to make more money to remit to family at home. In other words, financial 
support of dependants is a strong motivating factor for informal sector entrepreneurship. 
In terms of the differences between the two groups of informal sector entrepreneurs, 
there were several important findings:
?? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????? ????????? ???????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ???
suggests that for South African migrants, informal sector participation is more closely 
tied to the absence of formal employment than it is for refugees. Statistically, refugee 
entrepreneurs have about 50% lower odds of starting their business because of being 
unable to find a job, which may simply be a reflection of the fact that refugees are shut 
out of the formal labour market and do not even try to find employment there. 
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?? ????????? ???? ???? ????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????-
uct to South Africans and to contribute to the development of South Africa. Indeed, 
refugees had four times the odds of desiring to contribute to the development of South 
Africa than South Africans. 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
South Africans. Refugees had three times the odds of stressing the importance of obtain-
ing help from others in starting their business and going into partnership with others.
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
business. On a series of personal attributes associated with entrepreneurship, refugees 
had two to three times the odds of having these characteristics.
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
South African and only 2% of refugee businesses established before 2000. In total, 61% 
of refugee businesses and 44% of South African businesses were established after 2010. 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
before migrating. This does not suggest a massive competitive advantage conferred by 
prior experience. Over 80% of the refugee entrepreneurs were not operating an infor-
mal sector business prior to migrating to South Africa. The stereotypical idea that refu-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of this survey.
?? ?????????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ??? ????? ????????? ???? ??????????????????????? ????
located in the retail sector. However, the two groups tend to occupy and dominate differ-
ent market niches. South Africans are more strongly represented in food retail. Around 
70% of the entrepreneurs selling fresh produce and cooked food were South Africans. 
On the other hand, over 70% of those selling most types of personal and household 
products were refugees. In the service sector, refugees dominate hair cutting and braid-
ing, as well as car repairs and IT. South Africans tend to dominate shoe repairs, trans-
portation and car washing and guarding.
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
business established before 2011, almost 10 times the odds of starting a business with 
less than ZAR5,000 and almost seven times the odds of currently running a business 
valued at less than ZAR5,000, which does suggest that for reasons unrelated to prior 
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experience, refugees tend to run higher value businesses and grow them more effec-
tively. 
These findings led to a comparative analysis of the business strategies of the two groups 
to see whether there were significant differences between them and which contributes more 
to the economy. The first point of comparison concerns business location. In the case of 
Cape Town, there are areas of the city where each group tends to dominate: refugee busi-
nesses are more common in the CBD and Bellville, for instance, while South Africans are 
more commonly located along transport routes in and out of the city (such as on streets and 
at taxi ranks and bus terminals). Half of the South Africans operate stalls on roadsides and 
21% at taxi ranks. This compares with only 31% and 2% of refugees respectively. The other 
major difference is that half of the refugees operate from a fixed shop or workshop, com-
pared to only 8% of the South Africans. When compared with the refugee entrepreneurs, 
the South African migrant entrepreneurs had greater odds of choosing a business location 
based on it having the greatest number of potential customers, tradition, cost of land, and 
fewer police in the area. The refugees had higher odds of choosing their business location 
based on the other locational factors, especially access to services, property rentals, safety 
concerns, and distance from competitors. 
Second, refugee entrepreneurs were much more likely than South Africans to rent their 
business premises. Almost 60% paid rent to a South African landlord. Another 13% paid 
rent to the municipality (as did 10% of the South Africans). Nearly 50% of South Africans 
operated their businesses rent free (compared to only 5% of refugees). What this means is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over 80% of refugees do. The refugee entrepreneurs also pay a higher monthly rent, on aver-
age, than those South Africans who do pay rent (ZAR4,000 per month versus ZAR2,820 
per month). In effect, many South Africans are able to augment their household income 
through renting business premises to refugees and therefore benefit from their presence.
Third, there is a common assumption that the strategies adopted by refugees give them 
a strong competitive advantage over South Africans. The South Africans had higher odds of 
adjusting their operating hours according to customer numbers and purchasing insurance. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????-
cantly higher odds of keeping business records, selling goods more cheaply than competi-
tors, purchasing in bulk with others and negotiating prices with suppliers. The final point 
of business strategy comparison concerns hiring practices. Almost half of the refugee entre-
comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector
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preneurs have paid employees compared to only 21% of the South Africans. The refugees in 
this sample provided three times as many jobs as the South Africans. However, refugee and 
South African enterprises create jobs for South Africans at roughly the same rate.
In terms of business risks, the official government stance towards violent attacks on 
migrant businesses is that they are the actions of fringe criminal elements. If mere criminal-
???????????????????? ?? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
affected and some researchers have claimed just that. They argue that the attacks on infor-
mal businesses in South Africa are structural in nature, shaped by competition and other 
localized factors rather than xenophobia. To them, some combination of criminality and 
economic competition explains the violence. This report takes issue with this conclusion, 
demonstrating that while South Africans are not immune, refugees are more vulnerable 
and that xenophobia needs to be reintroduced as an explanatory factor:
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
immune from any of these risks. Nearly a third had been robbed of their stock and 
nearly 20% had had income stolen. The degree of vulnerability to other security risks 
was much lower. Therefore, while South Africans in the informal sector are also victims 
of crime, there is no support for the contention that South Africans and non-South 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????-
times significantly so. For example, 21% had been victims of attacks or assaults, com-
pared to 4% of South Africans. Also, 19% had been harassed or extorted by the police, 
compared to 6% of South Africans. Some 38% had been victims of theft of income, 
compared to 19% of South Africans.
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
riencing all potential risks on the list. Refugees were nearly three times as likely to be 
victims of theft of income and five times as likely to be subject to demands for bribes 
by police. The odds of a refugee entrepreneur being physically assaulted, experiencing 
prejudice, and being arrested and detained were over five times higher than for South 
Africans.
?? ?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both groups in large cities such as Cape Town compared to the much smaller towns of 
Limpopo. For both groups, Limpopo was indeed safer than Cape Town. For example, 
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56% of refugees and 31% of South Africans had experienced theft of goods in Cape 
??????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????
in Cape Town. In both locations, however, the risks are significantly higher for refugees 
than South Africans. Indeed, refugees in Limpopo were more vulnerable than South 
Africans in both Limpopo and Cape Town. 
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other parts of the city, particularly as many of the reports of violence against businesses 
come from informal settlements, where general crime levels are much higher. For both 
refugees and South Africans operating businesses in informal settlements, the security 
risks are higher across almost all indicators. However, the difference in the degree of 
risk between refugees and South Africans is significantly greater in informal settlements 
than it is in formal areas of the city. The only indicator where formal areas are riskier for 
both is in the chances of having goods confiscated by the police. 
?? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
had been negatively affected by xenophobia: 38% versus 5%. There are two possible 
reasons for South Africans being affected: first, when collective xenophobic violence 
occurs at a particular localized settlement, it is possible that some South African-owned 
businesses may be caught up in the looting and vandalism. A second explanation is that 
there are cascading, spillover effects on South African small businesses with coopera-
tive, dependent relationships and linkages with affected migrant-operated businesses. 
This report set out to systematically compare the informal enterprises established by 
different categories of migrant in South African urban areas. This comparative analysis of 
refugees and internal migrants suggests that there is a need for much greater nuance in pol-
icy and academic discussions about the impact of refugee migration on the South African 
informal economy. The stereotyping of refugees in public discourse as undermining and 
destroying South African competitors is far removed from the reality. While refugees seem 
able to access greater amounts of start-up capital (although neither they nor South Afri-
cans can access bank loans), both groups seem able to grow their businesses. Partly this is 
because they tend to occupy different niches in the informal economy with South Africans 
focused on the food sector and refugees on services and retailing household goods. This 
may help to explain another difference between the two with refugees tending to patronize 
wholesalers for their supplies and South Africans purchasing from supermarkets and fresh 
produce markets.
comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector
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The idea promulgated by government that refugees have a competitive advantage as 
in-their-blood entrepreneurs is clearly fallacious. Despite South Africa’s liberal refugee leg-
islation, restrictive employment policies mean that working for, and then establishing, an 
informal enterprise is virtually the only available livelihood option. But to argue that refu-
gees come to South Africa with pre-existing skills and business experience is misplaced. 
Refugees, like small-business owners everywhere, are extremely motivated and hard-work-
ing. They employ several business strategies to achieve monetary success, although expan-
sion is hampered by the need to support dependants in South Africa and the home country, 
which limits reinvestment of profits in the business. These strategies are not illegal or even 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This report shows that the general effect of operating small businesses in the informal 
economic sector does make business owners of all kinds vulnerable, but this alone can-
not explain the greater vulnerabilities of the refugee cohort. Instead, xenophobia and their 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
protection and mistreatment by officers only exacerbates this insecurity. Refugees them-
selves are in no doubt that they are singled out and that it is xenophobia that drives the 
violence and harassment they experience.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, South Africa’s Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, made a 
public comparison between South African and migrant informal entrepreneurs, echoing 
popular misconceptions about both groups. She suggested that South African business 
owners were largely inept and should learn from the business practices of their foreign 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 1 At the same time, 
South Africans were at a natural disadvantage because they had no history of entrepreneur-
?????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??? ?????????????????? ??? ????????????
from the moment they are born, they are introduced to trade. Their mothers, uncles, every-
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2 These 
stereotypical comparisons are echoed in the research literature. There is a common idea in 
the business literature, for example, that poor black South Africans lack entrepreneurial 
ambition and that this helps to explain the relatively small size of the South African infor-
mal economy and the high rate of local informal business failure.3 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????4 South Africans supposedly display 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????????????-
formance than migrants.5 A comparison of South African and Somali spaza shop owners 
in Cape Town found that the latter scored better on various indicators of entrepreneur-
ial orientation including achievement, innovation, personal initiative and autonomy.6 In 
addition, migrant businesses grew faster and created more jobs than South African busi-
nesses. By contrast, some have suggested that business failure is not inevitable and that 
South African survivalists can grow their enterprises and create jobs.7 Other studies have 
suggested that the gap between South African and migrant entrepreneurs is not as wide 
as is commonly supposed. One study of 500 retail enterprises in Gauteng, for example, 
found that motivations to start a business did not differ significantly between South Afri-
cans and immigrants.8 A study of street traders in inner-city Johannesburg concluded that 
South Africans were actually more innovative than migrants, although they did not display 
the same levels of proactiveness and competitive aggression.9 While migrant traders had 
earned more than their South African counterparts in 2008 and 2010, in 2009 the South 
Africans were the higher earners.10 
comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector
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The sustainability of all informal enterprises is shaped by the challenges they encounter 
and the manner in which they are able to manage business risks effectively. A sizeable body 
of research has shown that all small enterprises in the South African informal economy face 
significant business obstacles, preventing them from maximizing their potential.11 These 
business risks include limited trading spaces; lack of access to loans from formal finan-
cial institutions; few technical, financial and business-related skills; excessive licensing or 
regulatory restrictions on business operations; lack of a well-defined policy framework for 
operating; intense competition with other similar businesses; and lack of infrastructure 
????????????????????????????????????12 
In South Africa, business risks are compounded by security risks because of the unpre-
dictable and often dangerous operating environment. These security risks are of several 
main types. In many cities, the informal economy is regarded with suspicion and even 
outright hostility by municipalities, and seen as a reservoir of crime and illegality.13 The 
resulting oppressive regulatory environment is enforced by the South African Police Ser-
vices (SAPS) and municipal police who make regular raids, issue fines, and confiscate 
goods.14 Harassment by police and enforcement officials is compounded by police miscon-
duct including demands for bribes and illegal confiscation of business inventory and stock. 
Informal businesses are regular targets of national (Operation Fiela), provincial (Opera-
tion Hardstick in Limpopo) and city-wide (Operation Cleansweep in Johannesburg) police 
purges of the streets and large-scale seizure of stock. The courts have generally concluded 
that these operations are largely targeted at the foreign-owned businesses. A 2014 Supreme 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza 
shops and tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave 
our shores.”15 The obverse of police misconduct is a failure to provide consistent protection 
when businesses are under threat or are victims of crime and other violence. 
Many informal businesses service the basic needs of low-income, crime-ridden com-
munities. This means that, by definition, they are vulnerable to opportunistic and often 
violent crime in the form of theft, robbery and assault. There is also a clear pattern of esca-
lating mob violence in many parts of the country which is increasingly directed at informal 
businesses.16 Nationwide mob violence and looting in May 2008 and early 2015 were the 
most high-profile examples but in the years between and since there have been numerous 
more localized attacks. These assaults generally involve widespread looting, destruction 
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and burning of property, and physical assault and murder. There is considerable evidence 
that this form of violence is targeted almost exclusively at foreign-owned businesses and 
cannot therefore be easily dismissed as non-xenophobic. 
The official government stance towards xenophobic attacks has shifted from a lack of 
acknowledgement of xenophobia’s presence to public denial of its very existence in the 
country.17 Instead, the attacks are consistently written off as the actions of fringe criminal 
elements. If mere criminality is the source of the plague of chronic violence against non-
South African entrepreneurs, however, we might expect South Africans operating in the 
????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ????????? ????? ???????????? ???? ? ????? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????18 
They argue that the attacks on informal businesses in South Africa are structural in nature, 
shaped by competition and localized factors other than nationality or xenophobia. One 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
competition in the spaza market in which foreign shopkeepers have come to dominate, lev-
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
South African shopkeepers.”19 They conclude that there is no need to invoke xenophobia to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion of criminality and economic competition seems to explain the violence.”20 
A larger study by the same authors examines patterns of violence in three cities and con-
?????????????????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is less about nationality, and more about whether you keep prices low and (presumably) 
profits high.”21? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????? ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????????
that xenophobia is not a factor, then we would expect there to be no difference between 
???? ?????????????? ???????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????? ????????????? ?????? ???
systematic evidence that these attacks are experienced more severely by non-South Afri-
can migrant informal business owners, then xenophobia needs to be reintroduced as an 
explanatory factor.
comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector
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METHODOLOGY
This report systematically compares a group of South African and non-South African infor-
mal sector entrepreneurs and assesses the similarities and differences between them, both 
in terms of their business operations and their business risks. The two comparison groups 
are (i) refugees (holders of Section 24 permits) in Cape Town and Limpopo and (ii) South 
African migrants operating businesses in the same localities. Without a census or register 
of informal sector businesses to create a sampling frame, an alternative strategy was used 
to ensure a degree of representativeness of the samples. Two procedures were adopted: (a) 
maximum variation sampling (MVS) to identify a sub-set of areas within the city (in the 
case of Cape Town and a sub-set of towns in Limpopo) in which to conduct the research; 
and (b) random sampling of the population within the selected research sites. MVS is based 
on the principle of maximum diversity, an extension of the statistical principle of regression 
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is sought by including a broad range of extremes. The precise application of MVS follows 
that used in a study of the informal sector in Bangalore, India.22 
Five different types of area in Cape Town were selected: commercial, formal residen-
tial, informal residential, mixed formal and informal residential, and industrial. Within 
each of these types, contrasting and geographically separated research sites were selected in 
the commercial (two sites), industrial (two sites), formal residential (three sites) informal 
settlements (three sites) and mixed formal and informal residential (two sites). In the case 
????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
was urban size. Six towns, covering a wide size range and scattered around the province, 
were selected. In each research site, the same systematic sampling approach was adopted. 
This approach is feasible because the survey was conducted in urban areas where houses 
and businesses are located along streets. Sampling was therefore conducted along street 
lines in each site, the mapped grid-pattern exhibited by streets was utilized, sampling one 
street after the other in successive fashion moving from west to east. After identifying the 
first five enterprises on a street, and randomly selecting the first of the five for the sample, 
every third enterprise was selected thereafter. Provided the enterprise was owned by a local 
(a South African migrant defined as someone born outside the city or province) or some-
???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
process was repeated in each survey site. Where business owners were not available for 
interview, field workers made three call backs to the enterprise, after which a substitution 
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was made. The number of refugee and South African entrepreneurs interviewed in each site 
is shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
TABLE 1: Location of Interviews in Cape Town
Refugees South Africans
Bellville 91 84
CBD 103 88
Delft 26 43
Imizamo Yethu 34 18
Khayelitsha 25 23
Maitland 40 10
Masiphumelele 10 34
Parow 82 24
Philippi 21 42
Dunoon 42 93
Nyanga 3 31
Observatory 27 12
Total surveyed 504 502
TABLE 2: Location of Interviews in Limpopo 
Refugees South Africans
Polokwane 159 166
Musina 121 74
Louis Trichardt 36 51
Thohoyandou 59 57
Burgersfort 96 41
Tzaneen 33 177
Total surveyed 504 566
In total, the survey drew a sample of 1,068 South African entrepreneurs and 1,008 refu-
gee entrepreneurs. For the purposes of this comparative analysis, the report combines the 
two sub-groups of refugees (in Cape Town and Limpopo) into one group and does the same 
with the South Africans. 
comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector
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COMPARING ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTIVATION
South Africans and refugees appear to face very different livelihood prospects in the coun-
try’s urban areas. Although South Africa does not have a refugee encampment policy and 
refugees are permitted, by law, to pursue employment, there is much evidence to suggest 
that they face considerable barriers in accessing the formal labour market.23 They have been 
shut out of the security industry (where many were initially employed) and face substan-
tial hurdles in getting employers to accept their documentation. South Africans, on the 
other hand, should theoretically have none of these problems but they face other barriers 
including limited skills and training, and high rates of unemployment (currently around 
30% nationally and as high as 45% amongst urban youth).24 South African migrants to the 
cities often end up living in informal settlements far from formal job opportunities and also 
have to compete in the job market with long-time residents of the city who have a signifi-
cant geographical and networking advantage. For both sets of migrants, then, the informal 
economy is often the only livelihood niche they can find.
The general literature on informal entrepreneurship conventionally divides participants 
into survival (or necessity) entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs.25 The former are 
driven to participate by the need to survive and because they have no other choice. The 
latter choose to work in the informal sector because they see opportunities for economic 
advancement, or they prefer to work for themselves rather than for others, or they feel that 
they have the right aptitude. Distinguishing between these two types of entrepreneur and 
their likely differences in entrepreneurial motivation and orientation has generated a large 
empirical and methodological literature. In the South African context, studies of entrepre-
neurial motivation have sought to go beyond the idea of survivalism and demonstrate that 
many participants in the informal economy are not driven there out of desperation but are 
highly motivated entrepreneurs.26 
One of the most common ways of deciding what lies behind personal decisions to 
establish an informal enterprise is to measure entrepreneurial motivation. This involves 
the development of possible reasons why the informal enterprise was started and then ask-
ing respondents to rank them on a Likert scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (extremely 
important). Both refugees and South African migrants were presented with 24 possibilities 
to rate. A mean score was calculated for each group on each statement (Table 3). For ease 
of interpretation, we have grouped the 24 statements under four main themes (a) eco-
nomic survival; (b) provision of employment or a service to others; (c) business experience 
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and appeal; and (d) entrepreneurial orientation. Two things immediately stand out from a 
descriptive comparison of means. First, both refugees and migrants tend to assign the same 
relative importance to each of the 24 factors, which might suggest that they have a similar 
motivational profile. The second notable finding is that almost across the board, even on 
statements that had a low mean score, refugees’ scores were higher than South African 
migrants. This could indicate a greater general degree of commitment to participation in 
the informal economy amongst refugees.
TABLE 3: Entrepreneurial Motivation of Refugees and South Africans
South 
Africans 
(mean 
score)
Refugees 
(mean 
score)
Economic survival/financial support of dependants
I needed more money just to survive 4.10 4.31
I wanted to give my family greater financial security 3.69 3.97
I was unemployed and unable to find a job 3.43 2.89
I wanted to make more money to send to my family in my home area/country 3.00 3.57
I had a job but it did not pay enough 2.29 2.24
I had a job but it did not suit my qualifications and experience 1.44 1.62
Providing employment/product/service
I wanted to provide a product/service to South Africans 2.74 3.41
I wanted to contribute to the development of South Africa 2.69 3.35
I wanted to provide a service/product to non-South Africans/migrants and refugees 2.46 3.00
I wanted to provide employment for people from my home area/country 1.93 2.25
I wanted to provide employment for members of my family 2.19 2.27
I wanted to provide employment for other South Africans 2.10 2.29
Business experience/appeal
I wanted more control over my own time/to be my own boss 3.08 3.72
I have always wanted to run my own business 3.06 3.75
Support and help in starting my business was available from other South Africans/refugees 2.05 3.03
I decided to go into business in partnership with others 1.62 2.37
My family has always been involved in business 1.81 2.34
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Entrepreneurial orientation
I have the right personality to run my own business 3.01 3.45
I wanted to do something new and challenging 2.83 3.34
I like to learn new skills 2.83 3.41
I enjoy taking risks 2.73 3.24
I like to challenge myself 2.84 3.37
I wanted to increase my status in the community 2.48 2.99
I wanted to compete with others and be the best 2.48 3.07
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ??????-
gests that for South African migrants, informal sector participation is more closely tied to 
the absence of formal employment than it is for refugees. Of the four groups of factors, eco-
nomic survival motivations scored most highly for both groups, and providing an employ-
ment or service was the least important. The highest single factor for both groups was the 
need for more money to survive (both with means over 4.0). Also very important for both 
was the desire to provide family with greater financial security and the desire to make more 
money to remit to family at home. In other words, financial support of dependants is a 
strong motivating factor for informal sector entrepreneurship. Neither group was highly 
motivated by a desire to provide employment for others but refugees were much more likely 
to be motivated by a desire to provide a service or product to South Africans (3.41 versus 
2.74) and to contribute to the development of South Africa (3.35 versus 2.69).   
Although both groups said that wanting to run their own business and be their own 
boss was important to them, the refugees scored significantly higher on both factors. One 
of the major differences between the two was the amount of help and support they could 
count on from others, with refugees scoring much higher than South Africans (3.03 versus 
2.05). Refugees were also consistently more positive about their personal aptitude for run-
ning a business. This is clear in the grouping of entrepreneurial orientation factors where 
refugees scored above 3.0 on six of the seven factors compared to South Africans who 
scored above 3.0 on only one.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
similarities between South African migrant and refugee entrepreneurs, it is difficult to 
gauge their statistical significance. The main challenge is that the dependent variable for 
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the comparison (the importance ranking for each variable) is at an ordinal level of mea-
surement with varying distributions across each sampled group. This means that we need 
to use non-parametric tests of difference and bin the motivation factors into binary level 
indicators. Each indicator was therefore assigned two values: not important (1 in the origi-
nal scale) and important (2-5 in the original scale). A combination of odds ratio calcula-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
odds ratio calculations show how migrant status is associated with a change in the odds of 
ranking each motivation factor (where a value greater than 1 indicates increased odds and 
less than 1 indicates decreased odds). These calculations are supported by 95% confidence 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as a threshold for a statistically significant difference in the distribution of scores across the 
two groups) (Table 4).
TABLE 4: Odds Ratio Calculations of Motivational Factors
Entrepreneurial motivation factor
Odds 
ratio
95% confidence 
interval
Pearson 
chi-
square
Df
P-value 
(2-sided)
Lower Upper
I was unemployed and unable to find a job** 0.496 0.411 0.599 54.036 1 <.001
I had a job but it did not pay enough 1.012 0.851 1.204 .019 1 0.895
I had a job but it did not suit my qualifications and 
experience**
1.631 1.322 2.012 21.088 1 <.001
I wanted to provide employment for members of my 
family**
1.344 1.128 1.600 10.970 1 0.001
I wanted to provide employment for people from my 
home area/country**
1.840 1.540 2.198 45.499 1 <.001
I wanted to provide employment for other South 
Africans**
1.597 1.341 1.902 27.682 1 <.001
I needed more money just to survive** 1.770 1.275 2.457 11.880 1 0.001
I wanted to give my family greater financial 
security**
1.651 1.294 2.105 16.483a 1 <.001
I wanted to make more money to send to my family 
in my home area/country**
2.942 2.393 3.618 109.114a 1 <.001
I decided to go into business in partnership with 
others**
2.931 2.423 3.545 126.855 1 <.001
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Support and help in starting my business was 
available from other South Africans/refugees**
3.155 2.635 3.778 160.774 1 <.001
My family has always been involved in business** 2.149 1.793 2.575 69.422a 1 <.001
I wanted to provide a service/product to non-South 
Africans/migrants and refugees**
2.085 1.741 2.496 64.788 1 <.001
I wanted to provide a product/service to South 
Africans**
2.550 2.103 3.093 92.934 1 <.001
I have always wanted to run my own business** 2.806 2.268 3.471 94.245 1 <.001
I have the right personality to run my own 
business**
2.176 1.787 2.650 61.018 1 <.001
I wanted to do something new and challenging** 2.289 1.890 2.772 73.209 1 <.001
I like to learn new skills** 2.590 2.128 3.153 92.620 1 <.001
I enjoy taking risks** 2.299 1.901 2.781 75.044 1 <.001
I like to challenge myself** 2.466 2.028 2.998 83.975 1 <.001
I wanted more control over my own time/to be my 
own boss**
2.887 2.331 3.574 98.785 1 <.001
I wanted to increase my status in the community** 2.193 1.832 2.626 74.095 1 <.001
I wanted to compete with others and be the best** 2.581 2.151 3.096 106.434 1 <.001
I wanted to contribute to the development of South 
Africa**
3.677 3.001 4.505 166.788 1 <.001
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from South African to refugee entrepreneurs
The major conclusions from the analysis are as follows: first, refugee entrepreneurs had 
about 50% lower odds of starting their business because of being unable to find a job. Sec-
ond, refugees had almost four times the odds of desiring to contribute to the development 
of South Africa and three times the odds of stressing the importance of obtaining help from 
others in starting their business and going into partnership with others. Third, refugees had 
nearly three time the odds of starting a business with the intention of remitting money to 
family at home. Finally, refugees had two to three times the odds of assigning importance 
to the range of personal entrepreneurial orientation factors.
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CONTRASTING BUSINESS PROFILES 
The survey highlighted a number of similarities and differences in the informal business 
activities of refugee and South African migrant enterprises. First, more South Africans had 
been in business for a longer period of time (Table 5 and Figure 1). For example, 19% of the 
South African businesses were established before 2000, compared to only 2% of the refugee 
businesses. However, the majority of all businesses were started in the past decade with 
61% of refugee businesses and 44% of South African businesses established after 2010. This 
finding is certainly consistent with the general perception that refugees have been entering 
the informal economy in growing numbers.
 
TABLE 5: Year of Business Establishment
Year
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
<= 1990 46 4.4 1 0.1
1991-1995 49 4.7 1 0.1
1996-2000 115 11.0 18 1.8
2001-2005 124 11.9 70 7.1
2006-2010 246 23.6 293 29.6
2011-2016 462 44.3 608 61.4
Total 1,042 100.0 991 100.0
FIGURE 1: Year of Business Establishment
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Second, since both groups are migrants to the city, it is important to see if they go into 
business as soon as they arrive or if business start-up comes later. Only 32% of refugees and 
21% of South Africans started a business within the first year of arrival (Table 6). This gen-
eral pattern of a greater time lapse on the part of the South Africans is further demonstrated 
by the fact that 41% of them started their business within two years of arrival, compared to 
61% of the refugees. Both groups have similar numbers who waited three to 10 years but 
starting a business after 10 years or more was definitely a South African preserve (at 24% 
compared to 3% of refugees). The general time lapse in both groups indicates that imme-
diate start-up is not an option for most. Both tend to work first in the formal or informal 
economy, often to raise the start-up capital to branch out on their own. 
TABLE 6: Time Lapse Between Year of Migration and Business Start-Up
Years
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
0 213 21.4 304 32.0
1-2 196 19.7 277 29.2
3-5 173 17.4 201 21.2
6-10 172 17.3 140 14.7
>10 242 24.3 28 2.9
Third, it is theoretically possible that the shorter time-lag between migration and start-
up amongst refugees is also because they have prior business experience. The respondents 
were all asked what their main occupation was prior to leaving their home country or area. 
Only 9% of the South Africans said that they were operating their own informal sector 
business. The figure for refugees was higher, at 18%, but this does not suggest a massive 
competitive advantage conferred by prior experience. More than 80% of the refugee entre-
preneurs were not operating an informal sector business before migrating to South Africa. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
supported by the evidence of this survey.
Fourth, the survey found that the majority of enterprises of both refugees and South 
African migrants are located in the retail sector (Table 7). A small number of businesses 
(9% of refugees and 6% of South Africans) are involved in more than one sector; for exam-
ple, a business that manufactured and sold arts and crafts would count as both a retail and 
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manufacturing enterprise. Or a business offering a service, such as a hair salon, may also 
be involved in selling products. At this sectoral level of analysis, it appears that there is 
potential for significant intra-sectoral competition between the two groups. However, if the 
activity profile is disaggregated, the picture is more nuanced (Table 8). 
TABLE 7: Sectors of Informal Business Operation
Sector
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
Retail, trade and wholesale 828 77.5 778 77.2
Services 262 24.5 271 26.9
Manufacturing 41 3.8 60 6.0
Other 4 0.4 2 0.2
Note: Multiple response question
TABLE 8: Main Goods and Services Provided 
% of total 
enterprises 
owned by South 
Africans
% of total 
enterprises 
owned by 
refugees
% of South 
African 
enterprises 
selling product 
or service
% of refugee 
enterprises 
selling product 
or service
Retail 
Food and beverages
Fruit and vegetables 27.1 13.4 68.2 31.8
Cooked food (ready to eat) 18.4 6.7 74.3 25.7
Confectionary 17.5 17.0 52.2 47.8
Cool drinks/pop/canned drinks 13.1 22.3 38.4 61.6
Livestock (e.g. chickens) 1.7 0.2 90.0 10.0
Alcohol 0.9 0.4 71.4 28.6
Personal and household goods
Cigarettes 13.3 19.9 40.8 59.2
Clothing and footwear 7.7 19.5  29.4 70.6
Accessories (bags, sunglasses) 6.1 16.5 28.1 71.9
Toiletries and cosmetics 3.9 14.8 22.0 78.0
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Household products 3.4 9.3  27.7  72.3
Electronics 1.8 7.5 20.0 80.0
CDs/DVDs 1.1 2.6 31.6 68.4
Books/newspapers 0.7 2.9 19.4 80.6
Other goods
Arts and crafts 1.1 2.6  31.6 68.4
Hardware/tools 1.1 2.2 35.3 64.7
Car parts 0.5 0.5 50.0 50.0
Other 15.3 14.2 53.2 46.8
Services
Haircutting and braiding 6.4 15.1 30.9 69.1
Car washing 3.4 0.4 90.0 10.0
Car parking/guarding 2.3 0.0 100.0 0.0
Shoe repairs 2.0 0.7 75.0 25.0
Car repairs 1.2 0.5 27.8 72.2
Telephone 1.2 1.6 44.8 55.2
IT/internet 0.9 2.7 27.0 73.0
Transportation (taxi/passengers) 0.5 0.2 71.4 0.2
Rentals 0.4 0.1 80.0 20.0
Financial (loans) 0.3 0.1 75.0 25.0
Accommodation 0.2 0.2 50.0 50.0
Construction (building) 0.2 0.0 100.0 0.0
Traditional doctor 0.2 0.2 50.0 50.0
Transportation (goods) 0.2 0.1 66.6 33.4
Medicine (pharmacy) 0.1 0.1 50.0 50.0
Other 5.3 5.6 50.4 49.6
Manufacturing
Sewing/tailoring 1.7 2.0  47.4 52.6
Arts and crafts 0.7 0.4 66.6 33.4
Shoe repair 0.5 0.5 50.0 50.0
Furniture making 0.4 0.6 40.0 60.0
Security (gates and burglar bars) 0.1 0.4 20.0 80.0
Waste recycling 0.0 0.1 0.0 100.0
Other 0.6 1.9 24.0 76.0
Note: Multiple response question
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Table 8 shows that at least some South Africans and refugees are involved in every activ-
ity. However, the two groups also tend to occupy and dominate different market niches. 
South Africans are more strongly represented in food retail (the main exception being con-
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
the entrepreneurs who were selling fresh produce and cooked food were South Africans. 
On the other hand, over 70% of those selling most types of personal and household prod-
ucts were refugees. In the service sector, refugees dominate haircutting and braiding, as 
well as car repairs and IT. South Africans tend to dominate shoe repairs, transportation 
and car washing and guarding. There is less differentiation in the manufacturing sector, 
although the overall number of participants is small compared with retail and services.
Fourth, there was a significant difference in the amount of start-capital used by the 
two groups (Figure 2). Almost 80% of the South Africans started their businesses with less 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the spectrum, only 6% of the South Africans had start-up capital of more than ZAR20,000 
compared to 43% of the refugees. This certainly suggests that refugees have access to greater 
amounts of start-up capital but it may also be that the barriers to entry are much lower in 
the food sector (which is dominated by South Africans) as the initial spend on stock is likely 
to be much lower than for businesses selling personal and household goods. It is significant 
that of the 28% of refugees who started with less than ZAR5,000, most were food retailers. 
FIGURE 2: Amount of Start-Up Capital
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Fifth, both groups had added value to their businesses since start-up (Table 9). For exam-
ple, while 78% of South Africans started with less than ZAR5,000, only 40% valued their 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????????????????????????
figures were 28% and 9% (a fall of 19%). The proportion of South African businesses with a 
current value of over ZAR20,000 was 25% (compared to only 6% at start-up). In the case of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and 27% of refugees had moved into the highest value bracket.
TABLE 9: Current Business Value 
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
Less than ZAR5,000 349 40.1 75 8.5
ZAR5,000-9,999 177 20.3 83 9.4
ZAR10,000-19,999 128 14.7 110 12.4
ZAR20,000-29,999 57 6.6 110 12.4
ZAR30,000-49,999 59 6.8 115 13.0
ZAR50,000-99,999 46 5.3 148 16.7
ZAR100,000-199,999 28 3.2 135 15.2
ZAR200,000-499,999 18 2.1 93 10.5
ZAR500,000-999,999 3 0.3 12 1.4
<=ZAR1,000,000 5 0.6 5 0.6
Total 870 100.0 886 100.0
To assess the statistical significance of these differences, key variable comparisons were 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
included (a) year of establishment (<=2010 and >2010); (b) start-up capital (<ZAR5,000 
and >ZAR5,000); and (c) current business value (<ZAR5,000 and >ZAR5,000). The odds 
ratio calculations performed in Table 10 provide convergent validity for the observed fre-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
can entrepreneurs had almost twice the odds of running a business established before 2011, 
almost 10 times the odds of starting a business with less than ZAR5,000 and almost seven 
times the odds of running a business currently valued at less than ZAR5,000. All of these 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
test and the Fisher’s exact test.
migration policy series no. 78
23
TABLE 10: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Characteristics
Variables Odds ratio
95% C.I. P-values
Lower Upper Chi-square Fisher’s exact test
Established business before 2011** 1.993 1.67 2.379 <.001 <.001
Less than ZAR5,000 in start-up amount** 9.579 7.772 11.807 <.001 <.001
Less than ZAR5,000 in current value ** 7.243 5.515 9.514 <.001 <.001
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
BUSINESS STRATEGIES
Given the official and business literature perception that non-South Africans are much bet-
ter at running businesses than their South African counterparts, it is important to find out 
whether the two groups pursue different business strategies and activities. The first point 
of comparison concerns where the two groups choose to locate their business operations. 
In the case of Cape Town, there are areas of the city where each group tends to dominate: 
refugee businesses are more common in the CBD and Bellville, for instance, while South 
Africans are more commonly located along transport routes in and out of the city, such as 
on streets and at taxi ranks and bus terminals. This difference is clear from Table 11. Half 
of the South Africans operate stalls on roadsides and 21% at taxi ranks. This compares with 
only 31% and 2% of refugees respectively. The other major difference is that half of the refu-
gees operate from a fixed shop or workshop, compared to only 8% of the South Africans.
In addition to the observed variations in business location, the reasons for locational 
decisions also varied between the two groups (Table 12). When compared with the refu-
gees, the South African migrant entrepreneurs had higher odds of choosing a business 
location based on it having the greatest number of customers, the tradition of doing busi-
ness in a location, the cheapness of land, and the limited number of police in the area. The 
refugees had higher odds of choosing their business location based on other locational 
factors, especially access to services, property rentals, safety concerns, and distance from 
competitors. 
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TABLE 11: Usual Location of Business Activities
Business location
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
Temporary stall on the street/roadside 290 27.2 166 16.5
Permanent stall on the street/roadside 246 23.0 147 14.6
Taxi rank 221 20.7 22 2.2
In my home 102 9.6 34 3.4
No fixed location, mobile 87 8.1 26 2.6
Workshop or shop 86 8.1 525 52.1
Permanent stall in a market 87 8.1 106 10.5
Bus terminal 52 4.9 9 0.9
Railway station 21 2.0 1 0.1
Vehicle (car, truck, motor bike, bike) 19 1.8 3 0.3
In customer’s home 16 1.5 16 1.6
Craft market 6 0.6 7 0.7
Restaurant or hotel 2 0.2 8 0.8
Other 37 3.5 38 3.8
Note: Multiple response question
TABLE 12: Odds Ratio Calculations of Reasons for Business Location
Reasons Odds ratio
95% C.I. for O.R. P-values
Lower Upper Chi-square Fisher’s exact test
Place with greatest number of customers** 2.231 1.707 2.915 <.001 <.001
Access to services such as water/electricity** 0.341 0.284 0.409 <.001 <.001
Have a permit to operate there** 0.746 0.624 0.893 .001 .001
Rents are cheaper 0.969 0.807 1.163 0.732 0.744
Safer than other locations** 0.673 0.564 0.803 <.001 <.001
Due to passing traffic 0.949 0.775 1.163 0.615 0.641
Close to home 0.869 0.73 1.036 0.117 0.118
Own/rent the land** 0.458 0.381 0.55 <.001 <.001
Close to other enterprises* 0.825 0.692 0.984 0.032 0.035
Distant from other competitors** 0.647 0.534 0.784 <.001 <.001
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Always done business there** 1.262 1.061 1.501 0.009 0.009
Close to public transport 0.987 0.811 1.2 0.893 0.92
Cheap land** 1.739 1.424 2.123 <.001 <.001
Few or no police* 1.251 1.017 1.54 0.034 0.035
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
Refugee entrepreneurs were much more likely than South Africans to rent their busi-
ness premises (Table 13). Almost 60% paid rent to a South African landlord. Another 13% 
paid rent to the municipality (as did 10% of the South Africans). Nearly 50% of South Afri-
cans operated their businesses rent free, compared to only 5% of refugees. What this means, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????-
ises, while over 80% of refugees do. The refugee entrepreneurs also pay a higher monthly 
rent, on average, than those South Africans who do pay rent (ZAR4,000 per month versus 
ZAR2,820 per month). In effect, many South Africans are able to augment their house-
hold income through renting business premises to refugees and therefore benefit from their 
presence.
TABLE 13: Occupancy/Tenure Status of Business Premises 
Tenure status
South Africans Refugees
No. % No. %
Rent-free, with permission 276 26.1 58 5.8
I own it/am part owner 256 24.2 48 4.8
Rent-free, without permission (squatting) 214 20.3 59 5.9
Pay rent to private owner who is a South African (company or individual) 145 13.7 595 59.7
Pay rent to council/municipality 104 9.8 126 12.7
Share space/premises with others 28 2.7 2 0.2
Pay rent to private owner who is not a South African (company or individual) 17 1.6 91 9.1
Other 16 1.5 17 1.7
Another area of business strategy comparison concerns where the two groups source 
their goods and whether they tend to patronize the same outlets (Table 14). Most of the 
respondent refugees buy their supplies at wholesalers while South Africans patronize 
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obtain goods from fresh produce markets and directly from farms in greater numbers. With 
the exception of factory purchase, refugees tend to spend more on average at all outlets. 
For example, while fewer refugees patronize supermarkets, their average monthly spend is 
ZAR8,693 compared with only ZAR3,219 by the South Africans. In total, the South African 
respondents spend more than the refugees at supermarkets, at fresh produce markets and 
directly from farms. Refugees spend five times as much on average at wholesalers and far 
more in total (ZAR21 million compared to less than ZAR2 million). 
TABLE 14: Patronage of Different Suppliers
Source
South Africans Refugees
% using 
source
Mean 
monthly 
spend 
(ZAR)
Total 
annual 
spend 
(ZAR)
% using 
source
Mean 
monthly 
spend 
(ZAR)
Total annual 
spend (ZAR)
Wholesaler 27.8 6,248 1,855,724 61.0 34,728 21,357,827
Supermarkets 27.3 3,219 936,642 8.5 8,693 747,640
Small shops/retailers 11.4 1,798 219,407 11.0 6,282 697,350
Fresh produce markets 9.6 4,751 489,364 4.9 16,869 826,600
Direct from farms 9.6 8,875 905,270 1.2 14,708 176,500
Direct from factory 7.4 32,216 2,545,050 8.2 11,924 977,800
South African informal sector 
enterprises 5.5 1,956 115,391 3.2 5,391 172,520
Non-South African informal 
sector enterprises 3.2 1,607 54,650 6.7 13,246 887,500
Other sources 5.1 3,486 188,250 4.6 10,838 498,525
There is a common assumption that other strategies adopted by refugees give them a 
strong competitive advantage over South Africans. In addition to greater business acumen 
and skills, they have been viewed, inter alia, as securing discounts through group pur-
chasing, offering credit to consumers, operating for longer hours, and selling goods more 
cheaply. Statistical comparison of these, and other, business strategies indicates their rela-
tive importance to each group (Table 15). The refugees had lower odds of adjusting their 
operating hours to times of the day when there were most customers, and purchasing insur-
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ance. South African migrant entrepreneurs had lower odds of operating for extended hours 
(0.743) and individual bulk purchasing (0.67). Also, the refugees had two to three times 
the odds of keeping business records (0.475), selling goods more cheaply than competitors 
(0.395), purchasing in bulk with others (0.244), and negotiating with suppliers (0.340). 
TABLE 15: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Strategies 
Odds ratio
95% C.I. for O.R. P-values
Lower Upper Chi-square Fisher’s exact test
I open my business only during the periods 
of the day when I have the most customers* 1.213 1.020 1.443 0.029 0.030
I purchase insurance 1.078 0.732 1.587 0.703 0.768
I offer credit to customers 0.918 0.770 1.093 0.336 0.348
I extend my hours of operation** 0.743 0.620 0.890 0.001 0.001
I purchase stock in bulk myself** 0.670 0.562 0.800 <.001 <.001
I charge different prices for different 
customers** 0.660 0.545 0.799 <.001 <.001
I look for the cheapest prices for goods by 
consulting the media** 0.656 0.538 0.800 <.001 <.001
I engage in shareholding** 0.562 0.437 0.722 <.001 <.001
I keep records of my business accounts** 0.475 0.398 0.566 <.001 <.001
I look for the cheapest prices for goods by 
asking other entrepreneurs** 0.439 0.367 0.525 <.001 <.001
I sell goods more cheaply than my 
competitors** 0.395 0.325 0.481 <.001 <.001
I purchase stock in bulk together with 
others** 0.344 0.278 0.424 <.001 <.001
I negotiate prices with my suppliers** 0.340 0.284 0.407 <.001 <.001
I look for cheapest prices for goods by 
calling suppliers** 0.230 0.191 0.278 <.001 <.001
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
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The final point of business strategy comparison concerns the hiring practices of the two 
groups of entrepreneurs. Almost half of the refugee entrepreneurs have employees com-
pared to only 21% of the South Africans. The refugees in this sample provided three times 
as many jobs as the South Africans. Table 16 provides statistical confirmation of the greater 
?????????????????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ?????? ????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ?????????
exact test calculations. 
TABLE 16: Odds Ratio Calculations for Employment-Generation
Variables Odds ratio
95% C.I. P-values
Lower Upper Chi-square Fisher’s exact test
Currently have employees** 0.273 0.225 0.332 <.001 <.001
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
A breakdown of employees by sex and national origin shows some differences in the 
hiring patterns of the two groups (Table 17). In total, 9% of refugees hire South African 
??????????? ???????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8% and 4%. Refugees show a preference for hiring South African women over men with 
16% employing women full-time and 4% part-time (compared to 9% and 1% for men). In 
the sample as a whole, 30% are South Africans employed by refugees and 28% are South 
Africans employed by other South Africans. This suggests that both refugee and South 
??????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????????
difference is in the employment of non-South Africans. Less than 5% of the total number 
of employees are non-South Africans employed by South Africans, whereas 39% are non-
South Africans employed by refugees. 
migration policy series no. 78
29
TABLE 17: Employment Categories of Informal Business Employees
Employee categories
South Africans Refugees
Total no. of 
employees
% of total 
entrepre-
neurs
% of all 
employees
Total no. of 
employees
% of total 
entrepre-
neurs
% of all 
employees
South African males 
(full-time)
166 8.0 10.8 145 9.1 9.5
South African females 
(full-time) 
172 8.0 11.2 231 15.9 15.1
South African males 
(part-time)
66 3.6 4.3 16 1.1 1.0
South African females 
(part-time)
29 1.8 1.9 61 4.1 4.0
Non-South African males 
(full/part-time)
27 1.7 1.8 406 21.8 26.5
Non-South African females 
(full/part-time)
21 1.7 1.8 194 11.9 12.6
COMPARATIVE SECURITY RISKS 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of entrepreneurs. First, it is clear from the table that not every South African and refugee 
respondent has been affected. This is an important initial finding because it does suggest 
that most informal entrepreneurs are able to run their businesses without significant inter-
ference. This may be because of where they are located or the measures and precautions 
they take to protect themselves. Second, it is clear that South Africans are not immune 
from any of these risks. Nearly a third had been robbed of their stock and nearly 20% had 
had income stolen. The degree of vulnerability to other security risks was much lower but 
not non-existent. To this extent, therefore, South Africans in the informal sector are also 
victims of crime. But there is no support here for the contention that South Africans and 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????
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TABLE 18: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs
Refugees  
% affected 
South Africans  
% affected 
Prejudice against my nationality 48.0 2.2
Crime/theft of goods/stock 47.8 30.9
Crime/theft of money/income 38.1 18.5
Verbal insults against my business 34.2 7.9
Conflict with South African entrepreneurs 32.7 21.1
Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs 27.1 19.0
Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans 21.4 3.5
Harassment/demand of bribes by police 18.7 5.5
Confiscation of goods by police 14.7 6.4
Arrest/detention of entrepreneur/employees 8.5 1.4
Physical attacks/assaults by police 7.9 1.1
Prejudice against my gender 6.5 5.0
On every count, the proportion of refugees affected was higher, sometimes significantly 
so. For example, 47% of refugees cited prejudice against their nationality as a risk to their 
business, compared to only 2% of South Africans. Also, 34% of refugees were affected by 
verbal insults against their business, compared to only 8% of South Africans. Forty-eight 
percent of refugees, compared with 31% of South Africans, had been affected by theft of 
their goods and stock. Similarly, 38% of refugees, compared with 19% of South Africans, 
had been affected by theft of their income. Refugees reported higher levels of conflict with 
South African competitors (33%) than South Africans did with refugees (19%) and with 
other South Africans (21%). Interestingly, refugees also reported higher levels of conflict 
with other refugee businesses (27%). The details and outcomes of such conflicts need fur-
ther research, but the findings suggest that we cannot assume that refugees are a homog-
enous group with identical interests. 
The descriptive comparisons which suggest that refugees are more likely than South 
Africans to be affected by the various security risks are validated statistically in Table 19. 
South African entrepreneurs had lower odds of experiencing all potential risks on the list. 
Refugees were nearly three times more likely to be victims of theft of income and five times 
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more likely to be subject to demands for bribes by police. The odds of a refugee entrepre-
neur being physically assaulted, experiencing prejudice, and being arrested and detained 
were over five times higher than for South Africans.
TABLE 19: Odds Ratio Calculations for Business Problems
Odds 
ratio
95% 
confidence 
interval
Pearson 
chi-
square
Df P-value 2-sided n
Lower Upper
Prejudice against my gender 0.782 0.539 1.136 1.671 1 0.196 2051
Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs** 0.644 0.524 0.792 17.489 1 <.001 2056
Conflict with South African entrepreneurs** 0.552 0.453 0.673 34.938 1 <.001 2054
Crime/theft of goods/stock** 0.492 0.411 0.589 60.363 1 <.001 2052
Crime/theft of money/income** 0.373 0.305 0.456 95.509 1 <.001 2050
Harassment/demands for bribes by police** 0.241 0.176 0.330 88.722 1 <.001 2046
Confiscation of goods by police** 0.403 0.298 0.545 36.629 1 <.001 2047
Arrest/detention of yourself/employees** 0.179 0.105 0.303 50.513 1 <.001 2045
Verbal insults against your business** 0.167 0.129 0.216 214.406 1 <.001 2050
Physical attacks/assaults by police** 0.158 0.089 0.282 50.517 1 <.001 2052
Physical attacks/assaults by other South Africans** 0.137 0.096 0.196 150.979 1 <.001 2047
Prejudice against my nationality** 0.025 0.017 0.039 577.723 1 <.001 2049
*p<.05
**p<.01
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
In theory, we might expect to see higher degrees of informal business security risks 
for both groups in large cities such as Cape Town compared to the much smaller towns of 
Limpopo (Table 20). In the case of refugees, and with the exceptions of prejudice, verbal 
insults and treatment by police, Limpopo was indeed safer than Cape Town. For South 
Africans, Cape Town was also a more dangerous place to run a business. For example, 
56% of refugees and 31% of South Africans had experienced theft of goods in Cape Town. 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
Town. In both locations, however, the risks are significantly higher for refugees than South 
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Africans. Indeed, refugees in Limpopo were less secure than South Africans in both Lim-
popo and Cape Town. Theft of goods had affected 38% of refugees in Limpopo compared 
with around 30% of South Africans in both Limpopo and Cape Town. Also, 31% of refugees 
in Limpopo had experienced theft of money compared with 12% of South Africans in Lim-
popo and 26% in Cape Town. Some 19% of Limpopo refugees had experienced physical 
assaults or attacks compared with 2% of South Africans in Limpopo and 7% in Cape Town.
TABLE 20: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs by Location
Cape Town Limpopo
Refugees  
% affected
South 
Africans  
% affected
Refugees  
% affected
South 
Africans  
% affected
Prejudice against my nationality 47.2 3.6 47.6 1.1
Crime/theft of goods/stock 56.2 30.9 38.3 30.4
Crime/theft of money/income 43.8 25.7 31.3 11.8
Verbal insults against my business 32.1 9.0 35.3 6.9
Conflict with South African entrepreneurs 34.5 20.3 30.2 21.4
Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs 27.9 15.7 25.6 22.1
Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans 23.0 5.8 19.0 1.6
Harassment/demand of bribes by police 10.5 6.6 26.2 3.9
Confiscation of goods by police 10.1 8.0 18.8 4.9
Arrest/detention of entrepreneur/employees 7.5 2.0 9.1 1.2
Physical attacks/assaults by police 6.7 1.6 8.7 1.1
Prejudice against my gender 5.8 6.8 6.9 3.5
Another common belief is that security risks are higher in informal settlements than 
in other parts of the city, particularly as many of the reports of violence against businesses 
come from informal settlements, which also have much higher general crime levels. To test 
this hypothesis, we focused only on Cape Town and divided refugees and South Africans 
into two groups according to whether they were operating in an informal or formal part 
of the city (Table 21). For both refugees and South Africans, the risks are higher in infor-
mal settlements across almost all indicators. However, the difference in the degree of risk 
between refugees and South Africans is significantly greater in informal settlements than it 
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is in formal areas of the city. The only indicator where formal areas are riskier for both is in 
the chances of having goods confiscated by the police. Since the police barely venture into 
large swathes of informal settlement, this is not surprising. Refugees are slightly more likely 
to experience theft of goods in the formal versus informal areas (57% versus 54%) but the 
difference is small and indicates that this is a major risk for most businesses irrespective of 
location. 
TABLE 21: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs in Cape Town
Formal areas Informal areas
Refugees  
% affected
South 
Africans  
% affected
Refugees  
% affected
South 
Africans  
% affected
Prejudice against my nationality 44.9 1.7 53.8 6.2
Crime/theft of goods/stock 57.0 26.7 53.8 36.7
Crime/theft of money/income 41.4 19.5 50.8 34.3
Verbal insults against my business 30.1 6.8 37.9 11.9
Conflict with South African entrepreneurs 29.6 20.9 48.5 19.5
Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs 25.5 18.5 34.8 11.9
Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans 21.2 3.8 28.0 8.6
Harassment/demand for bribes by police 8.9 8.6 15.2 3.8
Confiscation of goods by police 10.2 8.9 9.8 6.7
Arrest/detention of entrepreneur and/or employees 5.1 1.7 14.4 2.4
Physical attacks/assaults by police 4.8 0.7 12.1 2.9
Prejudice against my gender 5.6 4.1 6.1 10.5
Unsurprisingly, refugees were far more likely than South Africans to say that their busi-
ness operations had been negatively affected by xenophobia: 38% versus 5% (Table 22). 
There are two possible reasons for South Africans being affected: first, when collective vio-
lence occurs at a particular localized settlement, it is possible that in the chaos and may-
hem, South African-owned businesses may be caught up in the looting and vandalism. As 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ???
move and every business becomes a target. Xenophobia does not only affect foreigners, it 
affects everyone” (Interview, 3 March 2016). A second explanation is that there are cascad-
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ing, spillover effects on those South African small businesses with cooperative, dependent 
relationships and linkages with affected migrant-operated businesses. 
TABLE 22: Degree of Impact of Xenophobia on Business Operations
Refugees % South Africans %
A great deal 18.3 1.4
To some extent 19.3 3.5
Not very much 18.4 5.7
Not at all 43.9 89.4
STRATEGIES OF SELF-PROTECTION
The dangerous and unpredictable environment in which informal entrepreneurs ply their 
trade in South African cities presents serious security challenges. It is clear from the previ-
ous section that while both groups are affected, refugees are at much greater risk than South 
Africans to a range of threats. There is no a priori reason why this might be the case, other 
than the fact that refugees are targeted because their presence is viewed by citizens and offi-
cials as unwelcome and even illegitimate. This was certainly the view of most of the refugees 
interviewed for this study who consistently identified the manifestations of xenophobia as 
the major security problem they faced:
We are victims of verbal attacks by clients. They say things such as “you must 
go to [your] country. Mandela is already dead. What are you doing here?” 
(Interview with Congolese refugee, 25 February 2016).
Some [customers] swear at me, my customers sometimes steal from me and 
when you catch them, they tell you harshly that you are a foreigner. And that 
you need to go back to your country. You are always faced with difficulties when 
you are a foreigner and as such you need to be patient and know how to deal 
with different kinds of people. There is too much disrespect here from South 
Africans because even someone who is way younger than you, they can swear 
and say nasty things to you if you are a foreigner. And they tell you straight that 
South Africa is their country (Interview with Somali refugee, 12 March 2016).
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If you are a foreigner, you are always affected by xenophobia. There is no way 
that you can live here and not be affected. Xenophobia starts from your customer. 
Some customers are very rude and if you respond, they will talk to you in their 
own language and scold you and then tell you to go back [to your country]. They 
have bad words for foreigners. Many times, my business was robbed when I was 
in Johannesburg. It was because I was a foreigner because they rarely stole from 
locals. Sometimes criminals would come to you and ask you to give them money 
and they would just ask you the foreigner. Why not the local people? That is 
xenophobia (Interview with Ethiopian refugee, 19 March 2016).
Xenophobia affects us all. We know who we are. We are foreigners and that 
doesn’t change. Nothing changes the reality. We live under alert anytime, no 
matter the set up in which we are operating in. We always know that the same 
people we are dealing with can anytime become a danger to us. It is difficult to 
trust any person in South Africa. The person who is with you here today, when 
there is a protest and foreigners are being attacked, he will be the first to attack 
you. There is no safety. I have not been attacked but I have seen other people 
being attacked and it is serious. It kills your business and it can also kill you 
(Interview with Congolese refugee, 25 February 2016).
Xenophobia is the most critical problem. I have been directly affected and have 
been caught up in the troubles. People have harassed me a lot, just talking like 
they want to kill you or to burn you or other such things. But that was when 
I was in Durban. Here [Cape Town] I have not been harassed. But there are 
many people who have been victims. They have been harassed and their goods 
destroyed, especially when there are strikes. The people just target anything that 
they can get. They are very cruel and they do not care what the owner will do to 
survive (Interview with Congolese refugee, 19 February 2016).
Xenophobia affects everyone who is a foreigner. When people loot your shop 
is that not xenophobia? When they chase you away from operating in an area 
because you are a foreigner that is xenophobia. There is xenophobia here, 
everywhere in this country. I have friends in other parts of the country, it is 
xenophobia where they live. I think South Africa is the only country with such 
xenophobia. I have been affected many times. When I was in Gugulethu, we 
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were robbed. That was xenophobia because they were robbing foreign-owned 
shops. Here I have been affected once during a strike and they took some things 
from the shop. So, xenophobia is everywhere here. The community leaders do 
not protect us during the strikes. Some of the leaders are at the forefront of 
looting when strikes occur, so how can they help? The government must protect 
us from xenophobia and crime. The police need to do their work better because 
right now they are not (Interview with Somali refugee, 7 March 2016).
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attack deepens exposure to security risks. A Congolese refugee said that the only recourse 
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instead abuse us” (Interview, Cape Town, 5 March 2016). Others displayed similar distrust 
of the police because of perceptions of bias:
The police are not very helpful. If you have a case against a South African, they 
will always side with the South African. So, it’s a waste of time to report a case 
against a South African (Interview with Congolese refugee, 24 February 2016). 
How accurate are these perceptions of South African hostility towards refugee busi-
nesses and business owners? A 2010 SAMP national survey of South African citizens found 
that only 20% were in favour of making it easier for migrants to establish small businesses 
and for migrant traders to buy and sell.27 Only 25% felt that refugees should be allowed to 
work in South Africa. A similar proportion said that they would take part in actions to pre-
vent migrants operating a business in their neighbourhood, 15% that they would combine 
with others to force migrants to leave, and 11% that they were prepared to use violence 
against them. Over 55% agreed with the proposition that migrants were victims of violence 
because they did not belong in South Africa. Only 36% said that refugees should always 
enjoy police protection and 25% that they should never enjoy protection. 
A number of studies have suggested that to lower the risks of victimization, migrants 
should adopt various measures to protect themselves and their employees.28 This survey 
sought to establish how common some of these strategies are and whether they are also 
adopted by South Africans (Table 23). One of the most common strategies is risk-sharing 
by partnering with other businesses. Nearly a third of refugees and 17% of South Africans 
adopt risk-sharing through partnership. Staying overnight on business premises (often a 
modified container) is a strategy pursued by both groups but, again, by more refugees (19% 
versus 9% of South Africans). There have been several high profile shootings of robbers by 
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refugees under attack but this survey found that only 6% keep weapons for self-protection. 
Other strategies (pursued by less than 10% of refugees and 5% of South Africans) include 
paying security guards, and paying protection money to the police or community leaders. 
Around 5% of both groups purchase insurance. Table 24 analyzes if the differences between 
the refugees and South Africans are statistically significant. With the exception of paying 
for insurance, refugees were far more likely than South Africans to adopt strategies of self-
protection. Refugees were five times as likely to pay for protection and twice as likely to 
sleep on their business premises and to partner with others to distribute risk. 
TABLE 23: Self-Protection Strategies Used by Informal Sector Entrepreneurs
Refugees % South Africans %
I partner with other businesses to distribute risks 31.0 17.4
I sleep on my business premises 18.8 8.7
I pay for security guards 7.3 1.9
I keep weapons for self-protection 5.8 4.0
I pay the police for protection 5.5 1.0
I purchase insurance 5.1 5.5
I pay community leaders for protection 2.5 0.6
TABLE 24: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Strategies 
Odds 
ratio
95% C.I. for O.R. P-Values
Lower Upper Chi-square
Fisher’s 
exact test
I purchase insurance 1.078 0.732 1.587 0.703 0.768
I keep weapons for self-protection* 0.648 0.430 0.976 0.037 0.039
I partner with other businesses to distribute risks** 0.470 0.382 0.579 <.001 <.001
I sleep in my business premises** 0.411 0.315 0.537 <.001 <.001
I pay for security guards** 0.245 0.148 0.405 <.001 <.001
I pay community leaders for protection** 0.222 0.091 0.543 <.001 <.001
I pay the police for protection** 0.180 0.094 0.347 <.001 <.001
* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
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Various other strategies emerged during the in-depth interviews although it is not 
known how common these are. For example, some refugees said that they hire South Afri-
cans to assist in communication with customers and also because it reduces their vulnera-
bility to violence. In addition to paying protection money to police and community leaders, 
refugees in one part of Cape Town regularly pay protection money to the local taxi associa-
tion. The taxi association then uses this to extort money from South Africans in the area 
too. Others make sure that they do not keep all their stock on the business premises out of 
fear that they will be cleaned out during looting or confiscation of goods by the police. Still 
others open for business only when they know that the police are not patrolling. 
CONCLUSION
This report set out to systematically compare the informal enterprises established by dif-
ferent categories of migrant in South African urban areas. This comparative analysis of 
refugees and internal migrants suggests that there is a need for much greater nuance in 
policy and academic discussions about the impact of refugee migration on the South Afri-
can informal economy. The stereotyping of refugees in public discourse as undermining 
and destroying South African competitors is clearly far removed from the reality. While 
refugees seem able to access greater amounts of start-up capital (although neither they nor 
South Africans can access formal bank loans), both groups seem able to grow their busi-
nesses. Partly this is because they tend to occupy different niches in the informal economy 
with South Africans focused more on the food sector and refugees on services and retail-
ing household goods. This may help to explain another difference between the two with 
refugees tending to patronize wholesalers for their supplies and South Africans purchasing 
from supermarkets and fresh produce markets.
The idea promulgated by the Minister of Small Business Development that refugees 
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South Africa’s refugee legislation and restrictive employment policies mean that working 
for, and then establishing, an informal enterprise is virtually the only available livelihood 
option. But to argue that all refugees come to South Africa with a pre-existing skill and 
business experience is misplaced. Instead, refugees (like small business owners every-
where) are extremely motivated, hard-working and dedicated. They employ several busi-
ness strategies to achieve monetary success although business expansion is hampered by 
the fact that only a portion of profits can be reinvested in the business, with the rest used to 
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support dependants in South Africa and their home country. These strategies are not illegal 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
minister also did, that South African migrants are poor business people is just as fallacious. 
While it is true that the odds of refugees pursuing a particular strategy, such as giving goods 
on credit, are generally higher than South Africans doing so, this does not mean that no 
South Africans pursue the strategy, as many clearly do. Instead of constantly pitting refu-
gees against South Africans as the official mind likes to do, it would be more productive to 
treat them in policy terms as a single group attempting, often against considerable odds, 
to establish and grow small businesses in a hostile or indifferent economic and political 
environment. 
This report has also undertaken a comparative risks assessment and vulnerabilities 
analysis for refugee and South African entrepreneurs operating small business ventures in 
the informal economies of Cape Town and various towns of Limpopo province. The results 
show that while both groups are exposed to several risks concurrently, refugee enterprises 
are far more vulnerable and overexposed. The social and structural insecurity experienced 
by refugee entrepreneurs is unambiguous from several key findings. Despite operating in 
the same localized environment and under similar conditions, this group encounters a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????-
ating small businesses in the informal economic sector does make business owners of all 
kinds vulnerable, but this alone cannot explain the greater vulnerabilities of the refugee 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
such operators. Limited access to police protection and mistreatment by officers only exac-
erbates this insecurity. 
What is also evident is that the majority of refugee operators have not, to date, been 
affected by a range of potential risks. In part, this may be because of the mitigation strate-
gies that they adopt. As refugee and migrant communities grow in South Africa, the emer-
gence of individuals who are able to mitigate common risks and build their enterprises suc-
cessfully is to be expected. But rather than treating these achievements with suspicion and 
negativity, as government tends to do, greater attempts need to be made to harness these 
productive capacities for the growth of local informal, entrepreneurial economies. These 
successes are not an abnormal development nor particularly driven by unfair advantages or 
??????????????????? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
develop and support informal entrepreneurship and small business growth in South Africa. 
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This report compares the business operations of over 2,000 South Africans and 
refugees in the urban informal economy and systematically dispels some of the 
myths that have grown up around their activities. First, the report takes issue 
with the perception that South Africans are inexperienced and unmotivated 
participants in the informal economy. Many have years of experience and have 
successfully grown their businesses. Second, it contests the view that refugees enjoy 
a competitive advantage because they come to South Africa with inherent talent 
and already honed skills. On the contrary, over 80% of those surveyed had no prior 
informal sector experience and learned their skills on the job and after coming to 
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informal sector between and within the two groups. However, business competition 
between refugees and South Africans is mitigated by the fact that they tend to 
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